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Abstract—From an arbitrary given channel code over a dis-
crete or Gaussian memoryless channel, we construct a wiretap
code with the strong security. Our construction can achieve the
wiretap capacity under mild assumptions. The key tool is the
new privacy amplification theorem bounding the eavesdropped
information in terms of the Gallager function.
I. INTRODUCTION
The information theoretical security [15] recently has at-
tracted huge interest. The wiretap channel [7], [21] is one
of its fundamental problems. On a wiretap channel, signals
from the legitimate sender, called Alice, is delivered to both
legitimate receiver, called Bob, and eavesdropper, called Eve.
The goal of Alice is to deliver messages to Bob with low
decoding probability while keeping Eve from knowing much
about the messages. The capacity of wiretap channels has
been determined for discrete memoryless channels [7], [21]
and for Gaussian channels [14] with a weaker notion of
security. The capacity of the above wiretap channels are also
determined with a stronger notion of security [2], [6], [11].
The exponential decreasing rate of eavesdropped information
is also evaluated in [11], [12]. Shannon theoretic study of the
wiretap channels is fairly advanced.
On the other hand, there is still room for research in the
actual construction of codes for the wiretap channels, which
we call the wiretap codes. Thangaraj et al. [20] proposed
an LDPC based construction for specific discrete memory-
less channels, and Klinc et al. [13] proposed another LDPC
based construction for Gaussian channels. Hamada [10] and
Hayashi [12] proposed general linear code based construction
for additive discrete memoryless channels. Muramatsu and
Miyake proposed a construction based on the hashing property
of LDPC matrices [18], whose decoding requires the high-
complexity minimum entropy decoder.
In those constructions except [12], error correction and
provision of secrecy are combined in the constructed cod-
ing scheme. This prevents us from using well-studied error-
correcting codes for the error correction in the wiretap codes,
and we need to adjust existing error-correcting codes or invent
a new wiretap code. This inconvenience may not be necessary.
In fact, in the quantum key distribution protocols, the error
correction and the provision of secrecy can be separately
studied and developed, see [16] and references therein.
Moreover, previous constructions for discrete memoryless
channels do not cover all the discrete memoryless channels
except [18]. It is desirable to have a construction of wiretap
codes that can be used for any discrete memoryless channels.
In this paper, we show two constructions of wiretap codes
from encoder and decoder in an ordinary channel code. We
do not modify the channel encoder nor decoder. We attach the
two-universal hash function to the encoder and the decoder in
order to realize secrecy from Eve. We show that our construc-
tion can achieve the wiretap capacity in the strong security
sense over discrete and Gaussian memoryless channels, while
some of previous constructions do not have proofs of the
strong security.
The key tools for our constructions are the new forms of
the privacy amplification (PA) theorem [3]. The original PA
theorem [3] does not achieve the optimal rate of PA, which
is the conditional Shannon entropy of Alice’s information
conditioned on Eve’s information. Renner [19] improved it so
that Renner’s version of the theorem can achieve the optimal
rate. However, it does not enable us to construct the wiretap
code using an existing channel code. The reason is that we
cannot numerically compute the necessay rate of hashing for
a given channel code in order for Eve’s information on secret
message to become sufficiently small. So we present two
new forms of the PA theorem. One is already given in [12].
However, it requires the random selection of a chennel encoder
from the given family of channel codes. We shall provide
another form of the PA theorem in Theorem 7, which enables
us to construct a wiretap code from single channel encoder.
Our new PA theorem is a nontrivial adaptation of the channel
resolvability lemma [11, Lemma 2].
This paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II we fix nota-
tions used in this paper. In Secs. III and IV two constructions
of wiretap codes are given. In Sec. V we present a novel
privacy amplification theorem bounding the eavesdropped
information in terms of the Gallager function. Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section we shall fix notations used in this paper and
review necessary prior results. Let X be the finite alphabet
of channel inputs, Y the alphabet of channel outputs to
the legitimate receiver, called Bob, and Z the alphabet of
channel outputs to the eavesdropper, called Eve. The legitimate
sender is called Alice. We fix the conditional probability or
conditional probability density QY |X of the channel to Bob
and QZ|X of the channel to Eve. We assume channels are
memoryless and further assume that
• both Y and Z are finite, which means that the channels
are discrete memoryless,
• or Y = Z = R and the channels are additive Gaussian.
Let Mn be the set of messages transmitted to Bob secretly
from Eve, ηAlice,n a stochastic map from Mn to Xn of a
wiretap encoder, and ηBob,n a deterministic map from Yn
to Mn. We use the natural logarithm instead of log2 for
convenience.
Definition 1: A rate R > 0 is said to be achievable if there
exists a sequence (ηAlice,n, ηBob,n) of encoders and decoders
such that
lim
n→∞
Pr[Mn 6= ηBob,n(ηAlice,n(Mn))] = 0,
lim
n→∞
I(Mn;Zn) = 0, lim inf
n→∞
ln |Mn| ≥ R,
where Mn is the uniform random variable over Mn and Zn
is the random variable for Eve’s channel output from channel
input ηAlice,n(Mn). The supremum of the achievable rates is
the capacity of the wiretap channel (QY |X , QZ|X).
Note that we employ the strong security criterion introduced
by Csisza´r [6] and Maurer and Wolf [17]. The necessity for
the strong security is given in [2], [17].
Proposition 2: [2], [6], [11] The capacity of the wiretap
channel (QY |X , QZ|X) is
max
PT ,PX|T
[I(T ;Y )− I(T ;Z)]. (1)
In the next section, we shall show a construction of wiretap
encoder and decoder from arbitrary given channel encoder and
decoder. In the construction, we assume that we are given
QX|T achieving the maximum of Eq. (1). Note that when the
wiretap channel is Gaussian, it is degraded and we can take
T = X without losing the optimality. In the construction, we
shall also use a family of the two-universal hash functions [5],
which is reviewed next.
Definition 3: Let S1 and S2 be finite sets and F a subset
of the set of all mappings from S1 to S2. The family F is
said to be a family of two-universal hash functions if
Pr[F (x1) = F (x2)] ≤ 1/|S2|,
for all distinct x1 and x2 in S1, where F is the uniform random
variable on F .
III. RANDOMIZED CONSTRUCTION OF A WIRETAP CODE
A. Encoder and decoder
In this section we shall construct wiretap encoder and
decoder from arbitrary given ordinary channel encoder and
decoder. The construction in this section can achieve the
wiretap capacity (1) if the uniform distribution on T realizes
the wiretap capacity (1). The assumptions are:
• We know QX|T achieving the maximum of Eq. (1).
Denote by T the alphabet of T .
• We are given a family channel encoders µAlice,n,g indexed
by g ∈ Gn mapping a message in the message set Ln to a
codeword in T n and a channel decoder µBob,n,g mapping
a received signal in Yn to a message in Ln. The channel
encoder µAlice,n,g is a one-to-one map, and T n is equal
to the disjoint union of µAlice,n,g(Ln) for g ∈ Gn.
• We are given a family Fn of two-universal hash functions
from Ln to Mn, where Mn is the message set of the
wiretap code.
Remark 4: The assumption on the channel encoders is
usually met with linear codes. We usually use the codebook
of a linear code whose codewords have zero syndrome. If we
allow codebooks to have nonzero syndrome, then the family
of codebooks with multiple syndromes constitutes the family
of encoders {µAlice,n,g | g ∈ Gn}.
From these assumptions, we can construct a wiretap en-
coder, which is an extension of Hayashi’s construction [12].
Choose a hash function Fn uniformly randomly from Fn
and G ∈ Gn. For a given message Mn to the wiretap
encoder of code length n, choose a message Ln uniformly
randomly from F−1n (Mn) ⊂ Ln, and compute the codeword
Tn = µAlice,n,G(Ln) from the channel encoder. Finally, com-
pute the actually transmitted signal Xn by passing Tn to the
artificial memoryless channelQnX|T . The decoder maps a given
received signal Yn in Yn to the message Fn(µBob,n(Yn)) ∈
Mn.
The random selection of Fn and Gn is a fatal problem be-
cause it requires sharing of common randomness between Al-
ice and Bob. However, we shall show that I(Mn;Zn|Fn, Gn)
can be upper bounded by an arbitrary positive number ǫ1×ǫ2,
which means that at least 100(1−ǫ1)% choices of fn ∈ Fn and
gn ∈ Gn keep I(Mn;Zn|Fn = fn, Gn = gn) below ǫ2. Thus
the legitimate sender and receiver can agree on the random
choice of fn before transmission of the secret messsage Mn.
B. Evaluation of the eavesdropped information
It should be clear that the (block) average decoding error
probability of the constructed wiretap code is lower than or
equal to that of the underlying code (µAlice,n,g, µAlice,n,g) for
g ∈ Gn regardless of random choices of Fn and Ln from
Mn. The remaining task is evaluation of the eavesdropped
information I(Mn, Zn), where Zn is Eve’s received signal
on the channel input Xn. To do so, we introduce Hayashi’s
version of the privacy amplification theorem [12]
Proposition 5: Let L be the uniform random variable with
a finite alphabet L and Z any random variable. If Z is not
discrete random variable then the conditional probability of Z
given L is assumed to be Gaussian. Let F be a family of two-
universal hash functions from L to M, and F be the uniform
random variable on F . Then
H(F (L)|F,Z) ≥ ln |M| −
|M|s × exp(ψ(s, PLZ))
s|L|s
2
for 0 < s ≤ 1, where
ψ(s, PLZ) = ln
∑
z
∑
ℓ PL(ℓ)(PZ|L(z|ℓ))
1+s
PZ(z)s
.
If Z is conditionally Gaussian
∑
z should be replaced by the
integration and PZ , PZ|L denote probability densities.
Remark 6: The above proposition is a combination of [12,
Eq. (2)] and the argument in proof of [12, Theorem 2]. It
was assumed that Z was discrete in [12]. However, when
the conditional probability of Z given L is Gaussian, there
is no difficulty to extend the original result. It should be also
noted that the uniformity assumption on L is indispensable,
otherwise the claim is false.
By the above proposition, for fixed G = g ∈ Gn we have
I(Mn;Z
g
n, Fn) = I(Mn;Z
g
n|Fn)
= H(Mn|Fn)−H(Mn|Z
g
n, Fn)
≤ ln |Mn| −H(Mn|Z
g
n, Fn)
≤
|Mn|
s × exp(ψ(s, P gLnZn))
|Ln|ss
(2)
for 0 < s ≤ 1, where P gLnZn is the joint probability
distribution and Zgn is Eve’s received signal with a fixed
g ∈ Gn
A major problem with the last upper bound (2) on
I(Mn;Zn|Fn) is that for a given channel code it is practically
impossible to numerically compute ψ(s, P gLnZn). To overcome
this difficulty we shall upper bound exp(ψ(s, P gLnZn)) by
exp(ψ(s, PTZ)), where PTZ is a joint distribution on T ×Z .
Let Tg = µAlice,n,g(Ln) that is a random variable
on T n. Note that Tg is the uniform random variable on
µAlice,n,g(Ln) ⊂ T
n
. By the assumption on the given
family of channel encoders µAlice,n,g, g ∈ Gn, the convex
combination of
∑
g∈Gn
PTg/|Gn| is the uniform distribution
Uniform(T n) on T n. By the concavity of exp(ψ(s, ·)) on
the channel input probability distribution1 [12, Lemma 1], we
have
1
|Gn|
∑
g∈Gn
exp(ψ(s, P gLnZn)) ≤ exp(ψ(s,Q
n
Z|TUniform(T
n))
= exp(nψ(s,QZ|TUniform(T )).
Observe that computation of the last mathematical expression
is easy for almost all channels.
What we have proved is
I(Mn;Zn|Fn, Gn) ≤
|Mn|
s × exp(nψ(s,QZ|TUniform(T )))
|Ln|ss
.
(3)
Observe that the minimization of the RHS of Eq. (3) over s is
also computable by the bisection method [4, Algorithm 4.1]
because it is convex with respect to s. The logarithm of the
1The concavity is proved under that assumption that Z is finite. However,
if the conditional probability QZ|X is Gaussian, the concavity proof needs
no change except notational ones.
right hand side is
s
(
ln |Mn| − ln |Ln|+
nψ(s,QZ|TUniform(T ))
s
)
− ln s.
(4)
By l’Hoˆpital’s theorem, we have
lim
s→+0
ψ(s,QZ|TUniform(T ))
s
= I(Uniform(T ), QZ|T ),
where the right hand side is the mutual information between
the channel output and the uniform channel input to the
imaginary channel QZ|T . Thus, by choosing s such that
ψ(s,QZ|TUniform(T ))
s < I(Uniform(T ), QZ|T )+ δ, we can see
that if ln |Mn| < ln |Ln − n(I(Uniform(T ), QZ|T ) + δ) for
some δ > 0 then Eq. (4) converges to −∞ as n → ∞,
which means the eavesdropper Eve has little information on
the secret message. This means that if ln |Ln|/n converges to
I(Uniform(T ), QZ|T ) and the wiretap capacity (1) is achieved
with uniform channel input then this construction also achieves
the wiretap capacity.
Drawbacks in the proposed construction is the random
selection of channel encoders. This requires that almost all
pairs of encoder and decoder have to provide low decoding
error probability, which is not verified with most of channel
codes. Moreover, in some case, for example the channel
encoder using the Trellis shaper [8], it is difficult to prepare
a family of encoders that satisfies the requirement. Thus, in
the next section, we show a deterministic construction of a
wiretap code from a given channel code.
IV. DETERMINISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF A WIRETAP CODE
In this section, we assume that the index set Gn has only
one element, and we are given a pair of an encoder µAlice,n
a decoder µBob,n. We also assume that the given family Fn
of hash functions satisfies the condition that for all f ∈ Fn
and m ∈ Mn we have |f−1(m)| = |Ln|/|Mn| in order
to apply Theorem 7 in Sec. V. This assumption on Fn is
satisfied, for example when Mn = Fkq and Ln = Fnq , using
the set of all the surjective linear maps from Ln to Mn.
Moreover, the linear mappings defined by the concatenation of
the identity matrix and the Toeplitz matrix considered in [12,
Appendix] also satisfy the assumption and is more efficiently
implemented in practice.
The construction of the wiretap code is the same as the
previous section except that there is no random selection of
encoders. The construction in this section can achieve the
wiretap capacity (1) if the distribution PT on T realizing (1)
also maximizes the mutual information I(PT , QZ|T ) to the
eavesdropper. In order to evaluate the average of the mutual
information, we develop a new privacy amplification theorem
(Theorem 7) based on Gallager function by modifying [11,
Lemma 2] in the next section. Applying this result, one can
show that
I(Mn;Zn|Fn) ≤
|M|s exp(φ(s,QnZ|T , PTn))
|L|ss
,
3
for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1/2, where
φ(s,QnZ|T , PTn)
= ln
∫
Zn
(∑
t∈T n
PTn(t)(Q
n
Z|T (z|t))
1/(1−s)
)1−s
dz.
If Z is finite, the integration should be replaced by summation
and QZ|T should be interpreted as the conditional probability.
Again, for a given channel encoder µAlice,n, it is also
practically impossible to compute φ(s,QnZ|T , PTn). We shall
show that a method to upper bound it. We have
exp(φ(s,QnZ|T , PTn)) ≤ max
Pn
exp(φ(s,QnZ|T , Pn)),
where Pn is a probability distribution on Tn. Observe that
φ is essentially same as the function E0 in [1], [9]. Thus if
P1,s maximizes exp(φ(s,QZ|T , P1,s)), then its n-fold i.i.d.
extension Pn1,s also maximizes maxPn exp(φ(s,QnZ|T , Pn))
[1], and we have
I(Mn;Zn|Fn) ≤
|M|s exp(nφ(s,QZ|T , P1,s))
|L|ss
. (5)
Observe that for fixed s and QZ|T , exp(φ(s,QZ|T , P1,s)) is
a concave function on a convex set and P1,s can easily be
computed [4]. Observe also that for fixed QZ|T , the function
maxP1,s[RHS of Eq. (5)] is a convex function of s, thus
minsmaxP1,s [RHS of Eq. (5)] can also be easily computed
by the bisection method [4, Algorithm 4.1].
The logarithm of the right hand side is
s
(
ln |Mn| − ln |Ln|+
nφ(s,QZ|T , P1,s)
s
)
− ln s.
Since φ is essentially E0 in [9], lims→0 φ(s,QZ|T , P )/s =
I(P,QZ|T ), where P is a distribution on T . Let Pmax be a
distribution on T maximizing I(P,QZ|T ). Therefore, by the
almost same argument as Section II, if ln |Mn| < ln |Ln| −
n(I(Pmax, QZ|T ) + δ) for all n, then I(Mn;Zn|Fn) goes to
zero as n→∞. If Pmax also maximizes the wiretap capacity
(1) and the given channel code achieves the information rate
I(Pmax, QY |T ) then the construction in this section achieves
the wiretap capacity.
V. NEW PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION THEOREM IN TERMS OF
THE GALLAGER FUNCTION
We shall show the following new privacy amplification the-
orem that is indispensable with the deterministic construction
of wiretap codes in Sec. IV.
Theorem 7: Assume that the given family of two-universal
hash function F from L to M satisfies that
|F−1(m)| =
|L|
|M|
, ∀m,
a fixed conditional probability QZ|L is given, and the random
variable L obeys the uniform distribution on L. Then,
I(F (L);Z|F ) = EF I(F (L);Z) ≤
|M|s exp(φ¯(s,QZ|L))
|L|ss
,
(6)
for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1/2, where EF expresses the expectation
concerning the random variable F ,
φ¯(s,QZ|L) = ln
∫
Z
(
EL(QZ|L(z|L))
1/(1−s)
)1−s
dz
and dz is an arbitrary measure.
Proof. Observe first that the joint probability PFL = PF ×
PL and the conditional probability QZ|L uniquely determines
QZ|F (L). We can check that the function s 7→ φ¯(s,QnZ|F (L))
satisfies the following properties:
φ¯(0, QZ|F (L)) = 0,
d2φ¯(s,QZ|F (L))
ds2
≥ 0
dφ¯(s,QZ|F (L))
ds
∣∣∣
s=0
= I(F (L);Z).
Hence, its convexity guarantees the inequality
sEF I(F (L);Z) ≤ EF φ¯(s,QZ|F (L)), which implies the
inequality
EF I(F (L);Z) ≤ EF
φ¯(s,QZ|F (L))
s
(7)
for 0 < s ≤ 12 . In the following, we denote the uniform
distriburtion on L by PL
Let 1 + u = 11−s , then 1 ≥ u > 0 and s =
u
1+u . Since
x 7→ xu is concave,
EF
[ ∑
ℓ′:F (ℓ′)=F (ℓ),ℓ′ 6=ℓ
QZ|L(z|ℓ
′)
]u
≤
[
EF
∑
ℓ′:F (ℓ′)=F (ℓ),ℓ′ 6=ℓ
QZ|L(z|ℓ
′)
]u
≤
[ ∑
ℓ′:ℓ′ 6=ℓ
1
|M|
QZ|L(z|ℓ
′)
]u
≤
[ |L|
|M|
QZ(z)
]u
= (
|L|
|M|
)uQZ(z)
u.
(8)
Using (8) and the relation (x+y)u ≤ xu+yu for two positive
real numbers x, y, we obtain
eEF φ¯(s,QZ|F (L)) ≤ EF e
φ¯(s,QZ|F (L)) (9)
=EF
∫
Z
( ∑
m∈M
1
|M|
QZ|F (L)(z|m)
1+u
) 1
1+u
dz
≤
∫
Z
(
EF
∑
m∈M
1
|M|
QZ|F (L)(z|m)
1+u
) 1
1+u
dz (10)
=
∫
Z
(
EF
∑
m∈M
1
|M|
QZ|F (L)(z|m)QZ|F (L)(z|m)
u
) 1
1+u
dz
=
∫
Z
(
EF
∑
m∈M
1
|M|
[ ∑
ℓ∈L:F (ℓ)=m
|M|
|L|
QZ|L(z|ℓ)
]
[ ∑
ℓ∈L:F (ℓ)=m
|M|
|L|
QZ|L(z|ℓ)
]u) 11+u
dz
=
∫
Z
(
EF
∑
ℓ∈L
1
|L|
QZ|L(z|ℓ)(
|M|
|L|
)u
[
QZ|L(z|ℓ)
+
∑
ℓ′∈L:F (ℓ′)=F (ℓ),ℓ′ 6=ℓ
QZ|L(z|ℓ
′)
]u) 11+u
dz
4
≤∫
Z
(
EF
∑
ℓ∈L
1
|L|
QZ|L(z|ℓ)(
|M|
|L|
)u
[
QZ|L(z|ℓ)
u
+
( ∑
ℓ′∈L:F (ℓ′)=F (ℓ),ℓ′ 6=ℓ
QZ|L(z|ℓ
′)
)u]) 11+u
dz (11)
=
∫
Z
(
(
|M|
|L|
)u
∑
ℓ∈L
1
|L|
QZ|L(z|ℓ)
1+u +
( |M|
|L|
)u
×
∑
ℓ∈L
1
|L|
QZ|L(z|ℓ)EF
( ∑
ℓ 6=ℓ′∈F−1(ℓ)
QZ|L(z|ℓ
′)
)u) 11+u
dz
≤
∫
Z
(
(
|M|
|L|
)uELQZ|L(z|L)
1+u
+ (
|M|
|L|
)uQZ(z)
( |L|
|M|
)u
QZ(z)
u
) 1
1+u
dz (12)
=
∫
Z
(
(
|M|
|L|
)uELQZ|L(z|L)
1+u +QZ(z)
1+u
) 1
1+u
dz
≤
∫
Z
(
(
|M|
|L|
)uELQZ|L(z|L)
1+u
) 1
1+u
+ (QZ(z)
1+u)
1
1+u dz
(13)
=
∫
Z
(
|M|
|L|
)
u
1+u
(
ELQZ|L(z|L)
1+u
) 1
1+u
+QZ(z)dz
=1 + (
|M|
|L|
)
u
1+u
∫
Z
(
ELQZ|L(z|L)
1+u
) 1
1+u
dz
=1 + (
|M|
|L|
)seφ¯(s,Q
n
Z|L),
where the inequalities can be shown in the following way.
Ineq. (12) follows from (8). Ineq. (11) and (13) follow from
inequality (x + y)u ≤ xu + yu for 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 and x, y ≥ 0.
Ineq. (10) follows from the concavity of x 7→ xu for 0 ≤ u ≤
1. Ineq. (9) follows from the convexity of x 7→ ex. Since the
above inequality implies
EF φ¯(s,QZ|F (L)) ≤ ln[1 + (
|M|
|L|
)seφ¯(s,Q
n
Z|L)]
≤(
|M|
|L|
)seφ¯(s,Q
n
Z|L),
using (7) we obtain (6).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, starting from an arbitrary given channel code,
we showed two constructions of wiretap codes. The first
one involves the randomized selection of channel encoders.
The second one is deterministic. These two construction can
achieve the wiretap capacity under different conditions. Our
constructions provide the strong security.
Ideally, the addition of hash functions to an arbitrary given
channel code should always achieve the wiretap capacity
whenever the given channel code achieves the capacity of the
composition of the artificially added channel QX|T plus the
physical channel QZ|X . The proposed constructions fall short
of this ideal. The improved construction should be explored.
The numerical computation of an optimal QX|T from given
QY |X and QZ|X is also an open problem.
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